A Technical Safety Concept only means something once it’s built into real hardware, and that’s where the architectural metrics from ISO 26262 Part 5 come in. This page covers the concrete safety mechanisms that let a BMS hardware design meet its assigned ASIL, eg:
- dual-path (high-side/low-side) contactor drivers that avoid a single point of failure
- independent watchdog and System Basis Chip de-energisation paths
- contactor weld detection
- diagnostic circuits inside a cell-monitoring AFE
- open-wire detection
- dual-ADC plausibility checks
- stuck-on balancing diagnostics
- alongside redundant current sensing
- cross-checks between pack voltage: cell-stack sum and I·R drop.
For the quantitative side of this: how these mechanisms combine into Single-Point Fault Metric (SPFM), Latent Fault Metric (LFM), and Probabilistic Metric for Hardware Failures (PMHF) figures → BMS Hardware Architectural Metrics (SPFM, LFM, PMHF).
See also: Dual-Core Lockstep vs. Dual-Microcontroller Architectures for ASIL D BMS, BMS Safety Goals & Concept (FSC/TSC)