A safety concept and a set of hardware and software mechanisms don’t add up to a safe product until someone can prove it, this is the job of the safety case. This page covers how a BMS functional safety programme closes the loop: verifying that hardware safety mechanisms actually detect the faults they’re designed for through fault injection testing. Deliberately forcing failures: a stuck contactor, a corrupted ADC reading, a dropped CAN frame and confirming the system reaches its defined safe state within the required FHTI.
Validating the full system on a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) rig before it ever sees a real pack and assembling the safety case itself: the argument, backed by the HARA, safety goals, architecture and test evidence from the rest of this hub, that a reviewer or assessor can actually audit.
See also: BMS Testing, BMS Hardware Safety Mechanisms, BMS Software Safety (ISO 26262 Part 6)